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Casualty Losses
By LAWRENCE J. LEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In view of Colorado's recent flood experiences, it seeems
appropriate to explore in some detail the taxpayer's burden of
establishing a casualty loss for income tax purposes. Section 165
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: "There shall be
allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year
and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." As a general
proposition it would appear that the sole criterion in section 165
for a loss deduction is simply that the taxpayer suffer a loss. As to
individuals, however, section 165(c) in addition requires that the
loss must either (1) be incurred in a trade or business or in a trans-
action entered into for profit; or (2) arise from fire, storm, ship-
wreck, or other casualty or theft. In short, any loss arising from
fire, storm or other casualty is allowable as a deduction under
section 165 (c) for the taxable year in which the loss is sustained,'
and the loss is allowable whether or not it was incurred in connec-
tion with property used in a trade or business or held in a trans-
action entered into for profit.' This general rule, deceptively simple
in statement, presents numerous problems in application.
II. CASUALTY DEFINED
A. Introduction
Although section 165(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 suggests the definition of a casualty by including the illus-
trative events, "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty," the regu-
lations fail to expand on the code language and in the discussion
*Partner, Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Holmes, Denver, Colorado; member of Colorado,
New York, and District of Columbia Bars; B.A., University of Illinois, 1955; LL.B.,
Cornell Law School, 1958; LLM., Georgetown Law Center, 1960.
1 It should be noted that an estate is required to deduct from the value of the gross
estate losses incurred during the settlement of the estate arising from fires, storms,
shipwrecks, or other casualties if the loss is not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 2054; Treas. Reg. § 20.2054.1 (1958).
However, if the estate so elects and satisfies the requirements set forth in Treas.
Reg. § 1.642(g)-i (1956), the loss may be claimed under section 165(a) in com-
puting the taxable income of the estate. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(c) (1960) as
amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1, CuM. BULL. 107.
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 165(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a) (1960), as
amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 107.
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actually presume an understanding of the term. However, the
Internal Revenue Service in its pamphlet entitled Disasters, Casualties
and Thefts,' gives the following definition of a casualty: "A casualty
is the complete or partial destruction of property resulting from an
identifiable event of a sudden unexpected, or unusual nature."
The pamphlet proceeds to list the following items as casualties:
Damage from hurricane, tornado, flood, snow, storm, shipwreck,
fire, or accident. With additional explanation, it also lists auto
accident, mine cave-in, and sonic boom. By way of contrast the
pamphlet states:
Progressive deterioration through a steadily operating cause
and damage from a normal process are not casualty losses. Thus,
the steady weakening of a building caused by normal or usual
wind and weather conditions is not a casualty loss.
Since termite damage normally occurs over a fairly long
period of time, a loss from such damage is not a casualty loss.
Moth damage to property is not a casualty, and such loss is
not deductible.
A similar definition was given in Rev. Rul. 59-102' which discussed
the relationship between section 165 and section 1033:
The term "casualty" denotes an accident, a mishap, some sud-
den invasion by a hostile agency; it excludes the progressive de-
terioration of property through a steadily operating cause. Charles
1. Fay v. Helvering, 120 Fed. (2d) 253. Also, an accident or
casualty proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect
of a known cause. Either may be said to occur by chance and un-
expectedly. Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Railroad Co. v.
Pullman Southern Car Co., 139 U.S. 79.
To be of the same nature or kind as fires, storms and ship-
wreck for purposes of section 165 (c) (3) of the code, an event
must first be unexpected and, second, be identifiable as the cause
of a provable loss. There must be a provable event which not only
has a casual [sic] relation to the diminution in value of the dam-
aged property but can be isolated from other events or sequences
leading to changes in value in the damaged property. The primary
significance of the latter requirement is that generally the amount
of a casualty loss deduction is in part determined with reference
to the value of the property before the casualty and its value im-
mediately after the casualty so that it is necessary to fix a time at
which the casualty took place.
A casualty may be the result of natural causes, i.e., through
the action of fire, wind, storm or the like, or may be the result of
3 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,CE, U.S. DEP'T F TREAUt JV, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES, AND THEFTS, p. 2 (March 1964).
4 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 200.
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human intervention so long as the human action is one which would
or should not be expected to produce the resultant loss.' The element
of human intervention as giving rise to a casualty loss is illustrated
by Ray Durden,8 which involved damage to a residence from blast-
ing in a nearby quarry. The residence was constructed in 1938 and
occupied by December 7, 1938. During the period of construction
and after occupancy, a series of quarry blastings took place and,
though these blasts shook the house, they gave rise to no apparent
damage. On January 20, 1939, a severe blast took place and there-
after the damage to petitioner's house became apparent. One issue
confronting the court was whether the taxpayers sustained a loss
arising from a casualty. The court held that the damage did result
from a casualty, stating:
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, it is necessary to de-
fine the word "casualty" in connection with the words "fires,
storms, shipwreck" immediately preceding it. "Casualty" has been
variously defined, including "an undesigned, sudden and unex-
pected event" - Webster's New International Dictionary; also
as "an event due to some sudden unexpected or unusual cause" -
Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 Fed. (2d) 537. The term "casu-
alty" "excludes the progressive deterioration of property through a
steady operating cause." Fay v. Helvering, 120 Fed. (2) 253; also,
"an accident or casualty proceeds from an unknown cause or is an
unusual effect of a known cause. Either may be said to occur by
chance and unexpectedly." Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Rail-
road Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 139 U.S. 79. The blast caus-
ing the damage to the houses of petitioners was unusual, heavier
than those occuring during the day by day blasting operations which
had theretofore been carried on. The damage was not caused by
any progressive deterioration of property. We conclude that it was
caused by a casualty in the ordinary sense of the word. Whether
under the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis it was
a casualty of the same general nature or kind, as "fires, storms,
shipwreck," offers a somewhat more difficult question. How-
ever, it has been held, under section 23(e) (3), that an automo-
bile wreck may be a casualty in closest analogy to shipwreck.
Shearer v. Anderson, 16 Fed. (2) 995, and Regulations 103,
section 19,23(e)-1, approves as a deductible item loss occasioned
by damage to an automobile and resulting from the faulty driving
of the taxpayer or another operating the automobile, or from the
faulty driving of another automobile colliding with it. In Ander-
son v. Commissioner, 81 Fed. (2d) 457, it is held, under section
23 (e) (3), that losses arising from ordinary highway mishaps may
be deducted even though caused by the negligence of the taxpayer.
Conversely, losses sustained through the action of termites have
5 Kipp v. Bingler, 64-2 USCT 9711 (W. D. Pa. 1964).
6 3 T.C. 1 (1944), acq. 1944 CUM. BULL. 8.
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been held not to be deductible under the heading of casualty.
United States v. Rogers, 120 Fed. (2d) 244; Charles 1. Fay, 42
B.T.A. 206; aff'd 120 Fed. (2d) 753. It thus appears that a proper
definition of the term casualty does not exclude the intervention
of human agency, such as involved in setting off the blast involved
in this case, and the prime element is that of suddenness as opposed
to some gradually increasing result.. The blast being considered here,
though set off by human agency, was sudden and unusual in vio-
lence. The fact that ordinary blasts had been occurring, without
complaint from the petitioners, from day to day, the fact that such
ordinary blasts caused no damage and that much damage was caused
by this particular blast, resulting in complaint by the petitioners,
all indicate that the occurrance was unusual in its results.
B. Events Constituting a Casualty
The Tax Court and Federal courts treat various types of casual-
ties in different ways; their disposition of the cases differ (1) in
recognizing the losses and (2) in determining the amounts thereof.
The following events (involving both natural causes and human
intervention) have been held to constitute "casualties" within the
meaning of section 165(c) (3): accident,7 blasting,' bomb explo-
7 See, e.g., Samual Abrams, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1546 (1964) (piece of furniture
dropped 16 floors by movers while being moved from one apartmeent to another) ;
I.T. 2231, IV-2 CUM. BULL. 53 (1925), modified on other grounds, G.C.M. 16255,
XV-1 Cum. BULL. 115 (1936) (bursting of hot water boiler in residence caused by
an air obstruction in the pipes which prevented the water from properly coming
in contact with the boiler and flowing through the system) ; The Wellston Co., 24
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 306 (1965) (collapse of roof due to faulty construction). An
automobile owned by the taxpayer, whether used for business purposes or maintained
for recreation or pleasure, may be the subject of a casualty loss, including losses
caused by nature or the intervention of man. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3) (1960);
Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939); Francis L. Davis, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
306 (1950); Nat Lewis, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1954); G.C.M. 16255,
XV-1 CUM. BULL. 115 (1936). Thus, a casualty loss occurs when an automobile
owned by the taxpayer is damaged and when (1) the damage results from the faulty
driving of the taxpayer or other person operating the automobile but is not due to
the willful act or willful negligence of the taxpayer or one acting in his behalf; or
(2) the damage results from the faulty driving of the operator of the vehicle with
which the automobile of the taxpayer collides. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a) (3) (1960).
It makes no difference that the automobile was operated by an unauthorized person.
Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995 (2nd Cir. 1927). However, the taxpayer is not
entitled to deduct as a casualty loss, damages (personal injury or property) including
costs incident thereto paid to another for injury to the other party's property or
person if the injury was not in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
See cases cited, infra notes 49 and 52. However, the damages and costs are deduct-
ible if the vehicle was being operated in the ordinary course of a trade or business.
Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1935) ; M. L. Rose Co., 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 213 (1954), but cf. Freedman v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 359 (5th
Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 1179 (1961) (accident occurred while taxpayer was
en route from his place of employment to a place of business in which he was a
partner).
8 Ray Durden, 3 T.C. 1 (1944, acq. 1944 CUM. BULL. 8 (damage to residence).
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sions and bombardment,9 damage in storage and transit," damage
to automobile mechanism, caused by child," damage to septic tank
and water line when lot was plowed, 2 drought, 3 earthquake," fire,"5
9I.T. 2037, 111-1 CUM. BULL. 146 (1924), modified by IT. 35119, 1941-2 CUM.
BULL. 96 (home of the taxpayer damaged as the result of the explosion of a bomb
placed on his front porch) ; I.T. 3519, supra (taxpayer lost certain personal property
located in a residence which was destroyed in 1940 as a result of bombardment of a
city in France).
10 See, Latimore v. United States, 63-1 USCT ff 9845 (N.D. Calif. 1963) (art objects
in storage either smashed, missing, soiled or crushed beyond restoration) ; Harry M.
Leet, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955), aff'd 230 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1956)
(goods stolen and damaged in transit, loss denied because claimed in incorrect
year); Leland D. Webb, 1 B.T.A. 759 (1925), acq. IV-1 CUM. BULL. 3 (1925)
(personal property in transit aboard naval transport). But cf. Guy I. Rowe, 3 B.T.A.
1228 (1926) ; Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948), affirming
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 27 (1947); Mildred Bauman, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31
(1951).
"1Hary M. Leet, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955), aff'd 230 F.2d 845 '(6th Cir.
1956) (taxpayer's auto did not have a mechanism which automatically disengaged
the starter when the motor was running; a child pressed the starter button and
damaged the starter).
12 Harry M. Leet, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955), affd 230 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.
1956).
'3 Winters v. United States, 58-1 USCT 9205 (N.D. Okla. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 943 (1959) (damage
to landscaping); Rev. Rul. 54-85, 1954-1 CUM BULL. 58 (damage to residential
property -soil shrinkage during period of drought). But cf. Kemper v. Commis-
sioner, 269 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C. 546 (1958) (evidence was
insufficient to establish the trees died of drought or any other casualty) ; Buttram v.
Jones 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943) (damage to landscaping loss denied for
failure to show change in value) ; Louis Broido, 36 T.C. 786 (1961) (taxpayer
failed to show a difference in value before and after the drought) ; Dick H. Woods,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 388 (1960) (damage to residence-soil settled causing
foundation to crack - loss denied for failure to show loss in value) ; Rev. Rul.
55-367, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 25 ("the drying up of a well resulting from prolonged
lack of rain is not such an unusual or unexpected happening and involves no such
sudden, identifiable event fixing a point at which a loss can be measured as to consti-
tute a casualty loss .... " ).
14 A.R.R. 4725, 111-1 CUM. BULL. 143 (1924) (damage to plant).
1
5 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(c)(3) ; see, United States v. Koshland, 208 F.2d
636 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Miree v. United States, 62-2 USCT ff 9756 (N.D. Ala. 1962)
(apartment houses) ; Sears v. United States, 59-1 USCT 1 9302 (ND. Ohio 1959) ;
Virgil R. Williams, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 106 (1960) (warehouse, carpentry shop
and hotel); Melvin Mailloux, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 942 (1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) (household furnishings and equipment);
Ticket Office Equipment Co., 20 T.C. 272 (1953), acq. 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 6 aff'd
per curiam on other grounds, 213 F.2d 318 (2nd Cir. 1954) (Plant and contents
including machinery, supplies and inventory items) ; Bernard L. Shackleford, 7 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 694 (1948) '(house and furnishings); J. H. Anderson, 7 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 811 (1948) (house and furnishings) ; Lorraine Turpentine Co., 20 B.T.A.
423 (1930) (distillery) ; Fred Frazer, 10 B.T.A. 409 (1928) (apartment house);
George B. Friend, 8 B.T.A. 712 (1927), acq. VII-2 CUM. BULL. 14 (1928).
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flood," freeze," high waves," hurricane,"9 lightning,"0 rain," snow
16 See, Ferguson v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1932), reversing 23 B.T.A.
364 (1931) (farmland flooded); Hutchings v. Glenn, 41-2 USTC f 9673 (W.D.
Ky. 1941) (architect's plans and drawing destroyed by flood); Smith, Trustee v.
Commissioner, 19 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.H. 1937) (flood washed away bank necessi-
tating repair to a penstock); Harris Hardwood Co., 8 T.C. 874 (1947), acq. on
this issue, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 2 (damage to plant used in manufacture of hardwood
flooring) ; Doyle E. Collup, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 128 (1962) (inundation of lake
front property including house); Frank R. Hinman, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1347
(1953) (flash flood washing away top soil). But see J. G. Boswell Co., 34 T.C.
539 (1960) ajf'd 302 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 860 (1962) ;
Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner, 252 P.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1958) affirming
28 T.C. 717 (1957); Central Arizona Ranching Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1304
(1964).
17 United States v. Barret, 202 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1953) (destruction of landscaping;
the case also involved the question of when the actual injury and hence the "loss"
occurred); Ferris v. United States, 62-1 USTC f 9448 (D. Vt. 1962) (unusual
conditions of precipitation, freezing and thawing, and temperature caused garage
wall to collapse) ; Stanley Kupiszewski, 223 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1559 (1965);
Donald G. Graham, 35 T.C. 273 (1960), acq. 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 4 (destruction
of exotic plants); Robert H. Montgomery, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 77 (1947)
(destruction of rare and exotic palm trees); Seward City Mills, 44 B.T.A. 173
(1941), acq. 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 9 (ice jam on river damaged foundation of a mill);
I.T. 3921, 1948-2 CuM. BULL. 32 (partial damage to trees held in trade or business);
O.D. 1076, 5 CUM. BULL. 138 (1921) (damage to flooring and furniture caused by
freezing and bursting of water pipes in a residence). But cf. Dean L. Phillips,
9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 501 (1950) (automobile motor frozen) ; Samuel Greenbaum,
8 B.T.A. 75 (1927) (a water pipe in the cellar froze and burst, causing a flood in
the cellar; the court disallowed the deduction - "a frozen water pipe is a common
occurrence").
18 Ferst v. Edwards, 129 F. Supp. 606 (D. Ga. 1955) (beach home collapsed after sand
was washed away); Rev. Rul. 53-79, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 41 (physical damage to
buildings, boathouses, docks, seawalls on Great Lakes as a result of their being
battered by wave action). But cf. Edward W. Banigan, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 561
(1951) ("The alleged loss by damage to the automobile by salt water is not due
to casualty .... ).
19 Biddle v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (damage to residential
property); Graham M. Brush, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 649 (1962) (damage to
residential property) ; Philip Allen, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 14 (1962) (damage to
residential property); Jay W. Howard, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 413 (1959) '(damage
to residential landscaping); Western Products Co., 28 T.C. 1196 (1957), acq.
1958-1 CUM. BULL. 6 (damage to landscaping) ; Oceanic Apartments, Inc., 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 944 (1954) (damage to resort hotel); Gilbert J. Kraus, 10 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1071 (1951) (damage to beach house); Carl A. Haslacher, 9 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 314 (1950) (damage to residential landscaping); Isabelle B. Krome, 9 CCH
Tax Ct. Mein. 178 (1950); Mary F. Cary, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 724 (1948)
(damage to residential landscaping); G.C.M. 21013, 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 101 (dam-
age to landscaping); I.T. 3304, 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 158 (damage to residence).
20S. F. Horn, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 177 (1959) (damage to trees) ; Harry M. Leet,
14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955), affd 230 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1956) (damage to
tree).
21 Clapp v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming 36 T.C. 905 (1961)
(artificial beach washed away by unprecedented rain) ; Kipp v. Bingler, 64-2 USTC
9711 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (involving a mud slide) ; Schirmer v. United States, 59-2
USTC It 9572 (N.D. Calif. 1959) (extraordinary rain caused soil slide) ; Delbert
P. Hesler, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 972 (1954) (drought followed by unusual rainfall
caused soil to subside and produce cracks in foundation) ; Clarence E. Stewart, 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 921 (1953) (rain storm flooded basement); A. J. Coburn,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 275 (1953) (damage to residential property). But cf.
Rupert Stuart, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 938 (1961) (mere presence of water damage
is not sufficient to show that it was the result of a casualty).
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and ice storm,2 sonic boom, 3 squall,24 sudden subsidence of soil,
cave-in or slide,2" thunderstorm, 6 vandalism," wind (tornado).28
The following events (involving both natural causes and
human intervention) have been held not to constitute "casualties"
within the meaning of section 165(c)(3): damage caused by
22 Whipple v. United States, 25 F.2d 520 (D. Mass. 1928) ; Mary Cheney Davis, 16
B.T.A. 65 (1929), acq. VIII-2 CuM. BULL. 13 (1929) (damage to landscaping) ;
John S. Hall, 16 B.T.A. 71 (1929), acq. VIII-2 CUM. BULL. 21 (1929) (damage
to landscaping). But cf. Paul E. Jackson, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1954)
(damage to residential and rental property).
23 Rev. Rul. 60-329, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 67 (compared to wind damage).
24 Ralph Walton, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 653 (1961) (severe squall from Lake Erie-
destruction of trees).
25 Tank v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1959), reversing 29 T.C. 677
(1958) (damage to residence located on river bank due to subsidence of the bank
caused apparently by dredging operations conducted in the river) ; Stowers v. United
States, 169 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. Miss. 1958) (damage caused by slide or cave-in of
a bluff upon which taxpayer's residence was situated which while it did not damage
the house did block the access to the house); Harry Johnston Grant, 30 B.T.A.
1028 (1934), acq. XIII-2 CUM. BULL. 8 (1934) (surface began to sink when
substratum "sticky clay or quick sand and clay" was set in motion); Rev. Rul.
57-524, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 141 (damage to residence caused by a "mine cave,"
i.e., the collapse of mine excavations beneath the surface). But ci. Kipp v. Bingler,
64-2 USTC 9711 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Daniel F. Ebbert, 9 B.T.A. 1402 (1928).
See also, Delbert P. Hesler, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 972 (1954). But see, Schirmer
v. United States, 59-2 USTC f 9572 (N.D. Calif. 1959) (gradual erosion of soil
by action of the wind or water is not a casualty) ; Texas and Pacific Ry. Co., 1 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 863 (1943); IT. 1567, 11-1 CUM. BULL. 90 (1923); Rev. Rul.
53-79, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 41.
26 David W. Murray Jr., 212 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1961) (destruction of trees);
Andrew A. Maduza, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1961) (rain caused taxpayer's
property to flood, destruction of trees and shrubs).
27 Charles Gutwirth, 40 T.C. 666 (1963) (vandalism and theft in residence occupied
by troops) ; Burrell E. Davis, 34 T.C. 586 (1960), acq. in result only, 1963-2
CUM. BULL. 4 (vandals broke into a house being constructed for petitioners and
damaged certain new appliances owned by the petitioneers and placed by them on
the premises). But cf. Edward W. Banigan, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 561 (1951)
(damage by "small boys" to hot water heater, hen coop, fence, and platform trailer;
the court holding "the law does not recognize loses due to vandalism nor can any
of the losses be allowed under the casualty section").
28 Barry v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 308 (W.D. Okla. 1958) (windstorm which
blew away approximately 4 inches of top soil in 36 hours) ; David W. Murray Jr.,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 7 (1962) (strong wind caused retaining wall to collapse) ;
Louis A. Edwards, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 925 (1960) (damage to trees); Richard
E. Stein, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 191 (1955) (destruction of a barn); William 0.
Lindley, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 355 (1952) (damage to trees and shrubbery on
residential site); Rev. Rul. 53-79, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 41 (damage to buildings,
boathouses, docks, seawalls, etc. on the Great Lakes as a result of their being battered
by wind). But cf. Maude T. Fearing, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 800 (1962), a~f'd on
other grounds, 315 F.2d 495 '(8th Cir. 1963) (destruction of tree and water damage
but taxpayer failed to show difference in market values before and after the wind
storm); Philip Handelman, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 878 (1961) (destruction of
yacht sails but failure to prove cost or whether loss was compensated by insurance).
1966
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household pets, 9 damage done by moths or rodents," death of live-
stock from disease, or old age,3' dismissal from employment,"
insect damage to and disease of trees and plants,33 ordinary wear
and tear or usual deterioration from use and age,34 property lost or
misplaced," routine breakage of household or personal items, "
29 J. Raymond Dyer, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1961) ("the breakage of ordinary
household equipment such as china or glassware through negligence of handling
or by a family pet is not a 'casualty loss' under section 165(c) (3) in our opinion."
The fact that "the breakage of the vase was not occasioned by the cat's ordinary
perambulations on the top of the particular piece of furniture, but by its extra-
ordinary behavior there in the course of having its first fit" makes no difference).
3 0 Edward W. Banigan, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 561 (1951) (rats); Rev. Rul. 55-327,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 25 (moths).
31 Rev. Rul. 61-216, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 134; IT. 3696, 1944 CUM. BULL. 241, modi-
fied by Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 200; see INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§ 1033(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-I (1957); INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1231;
Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(e) (1957).
32Evelyn R. Marks, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1128 (1963) (dismissal as a teacher and
loss of unused sabbatical and sick leave).
33 Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
956 (1965); Burns v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd
per curiam, 284 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Internal Revenue Service Field Release
No. 56, 5 CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6668; Rev. Rul. 57-599, 1957-2
CUM. BULL. 142. See also, Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537 (2nd Cir. 1931),
affirming 18 B.T.A. 674 (1930), acq. IX-2 CUM. BULL. 38 (1930) (pilings exposed
by action of storms and eaten by worms). The rule may be different with respect
to timber held in a trade or business. Orono Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States,
34 F.2d 714 (D. Me. 1929) (damage to pulp wood timber over a two-year period
by spruce bud worm) ; Oregon Mesabi Corporation, 39 B.T.A. 1033 (1939) acq.
1944 CuM. BULL. 22.
34 Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 T.C. 953 (1964) (tire blow-outs caused by overloading a
trailer) ; Charlie L. Wilson, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1963) '(casualty loss
claimed for two automobile tires and damages to interior of home caused by leaky
roof); Emil A. Wold, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 732 (1963) (breakdown of auto-
mobile engine); Henry W. Rice, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1350 (1956) (engine
ruined due to break in oil line of automobile which permitted all the oil to escape) ;
Harry M. Leet, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955), afI'd 230 P.2d 845 (6th Cir.
1956) (damage to fuel pump and muffler allegedly "sustained from flying stones
while driving over the temporary road....").
35 Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.S.C. 1950) (ring accidentally flushed
down toilet); O.D. 526, 2 CUM. BULL. 130 (1920); Emily Marx, 13 T.C. 1099
(1949), acq. 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 3; Edgar F. Stevens, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805
(1947) (ring lost while hunting). Cf. William Fuerst, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
208 (1951) (diamond bracelet apparently misplaced rather than stolen).
36 J. Raymond Dyer, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1961) (vase broken by cat) ; Robert
M. Diggs, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 443 (1959), aff'd 281 F.2d 326 (2nd Cir. 1960),
cert. denied 364 U.S. 908 (1960) (glassware and china" . . . accidentally broken
in the course of ordinary handling, by domestic help in the course of cleaning or by
the family cat.") ; E. M. Taylor, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 651 (1952) ("During the
calendar year 1948 he dropped his watch on the sidewalk in front of his home and
expended $8.50 as the cost of repair. . . . It clearly does not constitute a casualty
loss. ... ); Willard I. Thompson, 15 T.C. 609 (1950) acq. this issue, 1951-1
CuM. BULL. 3, rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1951) ("As to the
breakage of watch: This was a personal expense and the breakage does not partake
of the nature of fire, storm, or shipwreck. ); Charles J. Voigt, 8 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 662 (broken glasses).
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seizure of nonbusiness property by Police or other government
officers, s" termite," and dry rot damage."
37 Charles K. Richter, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 461 (1965) ; William J. Powers, 36 T.C.
1191 (1961) (seizure of automobile by officials in East Germany); A. Gilbert
Formel, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 782 (1950) ("The loss of money through seizure
by the customs officers of a foreign country in the course of their execution of their
official duties is not a loss from a casualty .... Again, even if the seizure were an
illegal seizure . . . that is not a 'casualty' within the meaning of the statutory pro-
vision.") ; Thomas F. Gurry, 27.B.T.A. 1237 (1933) (fee paid to attorney for services
rendered in recovering award compensating taxpayer for seizure of private auto-
mobile during WWI); Fred J. Hughes, 1 B.T.A. 944 (1925) (seizure of private
stock of liquors by police officers) ; I.T. 4086, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 29; Rev. Rul.
62-197, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 66. A special exception to the above rule applies in
cases of losses arising from confiscation of property by the Cuban government (any
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of the government).
INT. REV, CODE OF 1954 § 165(i) (1)A) ( 1964); The Revenue Act of 1964, § 238,
78 Stat. 19. The loss is treated as a casualty loss, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §
165(i)(1), but applies only to property (1) not used in a trade or business; and
(2) not held for the production of income. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(i) ( 1 ) (B).
Business property is governed by the general rules under section 165(i). The fol-
lowing requisites must be satisfied before the loss may be deducted: (1) the taxpayer
claiming the loss must have been a citizen of the United States or resident alien,
on December 31, 1958; (2) seizure must have taken place before January 1, 1964;
(3) if the property involved is tangible, it must have been held and been located
in Cuba on December 31, 1958. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(i)(1)(A)-(B).
In connection with (3), intangible property may have been acquired after December
31, 1958. Thus, the special relief provided does not apply to: (1) business property;
(2) tangible personal property acquired after December 31, 1958, and (3) losses
incurred after December 31, 1963, or before December 31, 1958. The loss is deemed
to have occurred on October 14, 1960, unless it is established that the loss was
sustained on some other day. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(i) (2) (A). In deter-
mining the amount of loss, the fair market value of property held by the taxpayer
on December 31, 1958, is treated as the market value of the seized asset regardless
of the date when the expropriation actually took place. Intangible property acquired
after December 31, 1958, the date of taking, is used for value purposes. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 165(i)(2)(B). Regardless of the time limits applicable generally
to refund claims, a refund or credit of any overpayment attributable to a certain
confiscation loss may be made as allowed if the claim is made before January 1,
1965. No interest is allowed on any refund or credit for any period from February
26, 1964. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(i)(3). See Rev. Rul. 65-87, 1965-1,
CuM. BULL. 111 (repossession of household furniture because of default on the
loan is not a casualty) ; Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547 (1961).
38 United States v. Rogers, 120 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Fleinstein v. United States,
173 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mo. 1954); Leslie C. Dodge, 25 T.C. 1022 (1956):
It is thus seen that the weight of authority is to the effect that gener-
ally, termite damages does not give rise to a deductible casualty loss. This
is for the reason that it does not occur suddenly, unexpectedly or from an
unusual cause; it is rather in the nature of a gradual erosion or deterioration
of property.
Charles J. Fay, 42 B.T.A. 206 (1940), affd per curiam, 120 F.2d 253 (2nd Cir.
1941) ; Rogers v. United States, supra. Only in exceptional cases where the invasion
and measurable damage have occurred within a relatively short period of time has
the loss been held deductible as a casualty loss. Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 198
F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Shopmaker v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Mo.
1953) ; Rev. Rul. 63-232, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 97. For taxable years beginning
after November 12, 1963, the Internal Revenue Service will disallow casualty loss
deductions for any termite damage -- "fast" termite damage not excepted. Rev.
Rul. 63-232, supra. For taxable years beginning prior to November 12, 1963, a
casualty loss deduction will be allowed by the Internal Revenue Service only in those
situations where the damage caused by he termites extended over a period of 15
months or less. Rev. Rul. 59-277, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 73 (revoked by Rev. Rul.
63-232, supra.) Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952), reversing
16 T.C. 1360 (1951) (house inspected in April 1946 and found free of termites,
termite damage discovered in April 1947); Shopmaker v. United States, 119 F.
Supp. 705 (E.D. Mo. 1953) (house inspected in December 1949, termites discovered
on February 8, 1951, the court treating the invasion or swarming of the termites
as the casualty event); Buist v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.S.C. 1958)
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(summer cottage inspected and found free of termites in September 1953, termite
damage discovered in June 1954) ; E. G. Kilroe, 32 T.C. 1304 (1959), acq. 1960-1
CUM. BULL. 4 (house inspected by bank in May 1953, thereafter by exterminating
company on January 9, 1954, and January 19, 1955, the court stating:
Bearing in mind the fact that an inspection had been made in 1953
when the house was purchased and that annual inspections were made on
the premises each year thereafter, the last having been made in January
1955 - about 3 months before the discovery of the termite damage in
question - plus the fact that there had been no exterior evidence of termite
activity and that there were 'fresh channels' in the kitchen wall and floor,
we are persuaded that the time within which the damage or loss occurred
was within a relatively short time prior to discovery in 1955. From the
record as a whole, we conclude that there was not termite activity in peti-
tioners' house between May 1953 and January 1955, and that the petition-
ers are entitled to a casualty loss deduction for the damage in question.
Henry F. Cate, Jr., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1146 (1962) (infestation existed for
approximately six months); Allan M. Winsor, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1959),
aff'd 278 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1960) (damage in the house had taken place in about
a year and a half). No deduction is or was allowable for any year where the termite
infestation and subsequent damage occurred over periods of several years. Rev. Rul.
59-277, supra (revoked by Rev. Rul. 63-232). Although the Internal Revenue
Service has changed its position, there is no indication that the courts will not
permit the deduction for a casualty loss arising from damage caused by the "fast
termite." See Leslie C. Dodge, 25 T.C. 1022 (1956) ; E. G. Kilroe, 32 T.C. 1304
(1959), acq. 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 4; Hale v. Welch, 38 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass.
1941).
3 9 United States v. Rogers, 120 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Rudolf L. Hoppe, 42 T.C.
820 (1964):
Section 165(c)(3) speaks of losses arsing from "fire, storm, ship-
wreck, or other casualty .... " And the term "casualty" has been interpre-
ted to mean "an accident, a mishap, some sudden invasion by a hostile
agency; it exludes the progressive deterioration of property through a stead-
ily operating cause." Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253 (C. A. 2); United
States v. Rogers, 120 F.2d 244, 246 122 F.2d 485 (C. A. 9) ; Matheson v.
Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537, 539 (C. A. 2) ; Leslie C. Dodge, 25 T. C. 1022,
1026. Thus, the foregoing cases have denied deductions for losses due to
such causes as termites, dry rot, and rust.
An exception to this rule appears to have developed in recent years in
the case of the "fast termite," where it has been held that termite damage
may qualify as a casualty loss if it occurs within a realtively short period
of time. Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 46 (C. A. 8) ; Joseph Shop-
maker v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.S.C.). And this Court has
undertaken to follow this line of cases in E. G. Kilroe, 32 T. C. 1304, 1306,
1307 (1959) stating that the "term 'suddenness' is comparative, and gives
rise to an issue of fact," noting that the claimed deductions for termite
losses were disallowed in some cases while allowed in others.
The alleged casualty before us involves dry rot rather than termites,
but we do not understand either of the parties to suggest that anything here
turns upon this difference. Accordingly, the question before us under
Kilroe is the factual one whether the dry rot discovered in petitioners' house
in November 1959 was of comparatively recent origin so as to qualify for
the requisite degree of "suddenness." Petitioners' position in substance is
that the fungus infestation began as the result of the unusually heavy rains
in January, February, March and April of 1958; that the ensuing damage
occurred over the following period of some 18 to 22 months; and that such
period is sufficiently short to justify classifying the loss as characterized by
the necessary "suddenness" to qualify as a "casualty."
We might well hesitate to say that a period of some three months that
we approved in Kilroe may be expanded to some 18 to 22 months without
subjecting the whole theory of "comparative suddenness" to a reductio ad
absurdum, but we do not reach that point because we cannot find that the
dry rot in question had its beginning at the time of those rains in the first
part of 1958 rather than at some substantially earlier date. Petitioners' con-
tention that the fungus infestation began with those rains is based upon the
assumption that their house was free of dry rot after the September 1956
inspection and repair of the property as recommended in the inspection
report. Although we had the imprcssion at the time of the trial that there
might be a basis for that assumption, a careful study of the record has satis-
fied us that the assumption is without foundation.
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C. Burden of Proof
The above list of casualty events is an "open end" list, i.e.,
other events may constitute casualties within the meaning of section
165(c) (3) if the taxpayer can demonstrate an identifiable event
(act of man or nature) which was sudden, unexpected or of an
unusual nature. Of course, the taxpayer may lose the deduction,
even if the identifiable event is one well established within the
casualty class, if he fails to show the other requisites, i.e., the
sudden, unexpected or unusual nature" of the event.
III. NECESSITY OF ACTUAL Loss IN VALUE
As with any claimed loss, the taxpayer must have actually parted
with something of value, the loss of which was not only the result
of actual physical damage to his property but also a loss in value
which can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Cast in terms of negligence law, the taxable event is a combi-
nation of a "trauma" (actual physical damage to taxpayer's prop-
erty) resulting from a "cause" (storm, fire, collision, etc.) which
was the "probable" cause of the damage.4'
In short, there must be an event (the casualty) which directly
culminates in actual physical damage, i.e., a loss which is both
immediate and measurable.42 Thus a prospective loss or an economic
loss without actual physical damage is not sufficient for tax pur-
40Kipp v. Bingler, 64-2 USTC ff 9711 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (failure to show that a slide
was caused by rain storm and not excavation) ; Clyde v. Jackson, 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 309 (1965) ; Rudolph L. Hoppe, 42 T.C. 820 (1964) (failure to show that
dry rot occurred with sufficient suddenness to qualify as a casualty loss); Jane V.
Elliott, 40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq. 1964-1 INT. REV. BULL. 5; Maude T. Fearing,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 800 (1962), affd on other grounds, 315 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
1963); Rupert Stuart, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 938 (1961) (water damage shown,
but failed to show evidence of a sudden or destructive force, or an identifiable event
in the nature of a casualty) ; Henry M. Leet, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 39 (1955),
aff'd 230 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.1956).
41 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 3 (March 1964): "The reduction in value of property
because it is in or near a disaster area and there is the possibility that the area might
again have a similar disaster is not a casualty loss. A loss is allowed only for the
actual physical damage to your property resulting from the casualty." See Kemper
v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C. 546 (1958).
Actual damage does not include a 'reserve" for repairs; James I. Goski, 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 828 (1965). The damage or loss must be the immediate and direct
result of the casualty, i.e., a result directly connected with and following the
casualty event. For example, a loss resulting from the sale of a taxpayer's residence
to a conservancy district under condemnation proceedings, was not deductible as a
casualty loss although the district was created as part of a flood prevention program
initiated because of a flood in the area. II-1 CuM. BULL. 92 (1923). Philip Allen,
1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 14 (1942). But rt. INT. REV. CODE § 1033(f) and Treas.
Reg. § 1.1033(f)-i dealing with the sale or exchange of livestock solely on account
of drought.
42 The casualty event is the identifiable event fixing the onset of the damage and the
physical injury closes the transaction. See Ferguson v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 893
(10th Cir. 1932); Louis Broido, 36 T.C. 786 (1961) ; J. G. Boswell Co., 34 T.C.
539 (1960), aff'd 302 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 860 (1962).
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poses. For example, although the taxpayer's farm land was in fact
flooded, no loss deduction was allowed for an alleged loss due to
a reduction in cotton "history," i.e., the possibility that the taxpayer
might suffer a reduction in his acreage allotment for the planting
of supported cotten due to his inability to plant cotton while the land
was flooded. Since there in fact had been no reduction of the
acreage in the year the loss was claimed, the loss was at best specu-
lative and prospective.4"
In Leonard 1. Jenard," involving the destruction of a tax-
payer's residence by fire, the taxpayer claimed he was entitled to a
loss deduction of $13,622.60 - an amount achieved by subtracting
from the amount of the alleged difference in the fair market value
of the residence before and after the fire ($32,000) the insurance
recovery of $18,377.40. Although it was stipulated as a fact that
a contractor engaged by the taxpayer restored the building to its
condition immediately before the fire (at a cost of $23,782.47) the
taxpayer, nevertheless, maintained that he suffered a loss by reason
of the fire which was more than the cost of restoring the house to
the condition it was in before the fire. This additional loss was
based upon the argument that:
[A] burned building suffers a loss in market value, over and above
the cost of restoring it to its condition before the fire; ... a loss
of value results because a prospective buyer in the market for a
house would, upon learning of the fire, fear that there may have
been latent structural weaknesses caused by the fire which were
not repaired; and, therefore, the very occurrence of the fire serves
43 Central Arizona Ranching Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1304 (1964); J. G. Boswell
Co., 34 T.C. 539 (1960), af'd 302 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S.
860 (1962).
4 Leonard J. Jenard, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 346 (1961). See also Clarence A. Peterson,
30 T.C. 660 (1958), appeal dismissed, involving a claimed casualty loss arising from
rainstorms. The Court noted:
Each of petitioners' expert witnesses was of the opinion that immedi-
ately preceding the rainstorm here involved, the fair market value of the
petitioner's property was equal tc. its cost to that time, or $87,053. One of
the witnesses was of the opinion that the fair market value of the property
immediately after the rainstorm was between $50,000 and $60,000 and the
other thought such value was approximately $65,000. The foregoing opin-
ions were based in part on the amount of physical damage to the property
and in part on what the witnesses considered would have been an almost
complete lack of prospective purchasers for or demand for the property.
Neither of the witnesses stated the portion of the decline in value testified
to by him which he attributed to physical damage or the portion which he
attributed to lack of demand. Each of the witnesses expressed the opinion
that petitioners' property has returned to the value it had immediately prior
to the rainstorm and one of them was of the opinion that it had returned
to that value by March 1954.
From the foregoing we think it is apparent that petitioners in claiming
a loss of $25,000 are not only seeking a deduction on account of the physical
damage to the property but also are seeking a deduction for a fluctuatiun in
the value of the property which they have continued to own and which they
have continued to occupy as a residence since March 1, 1952.
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to decrease the fair market value in an amount in excess of repair
costs.
While the Tax Court did allow a deduction of $5,405.07 dif-
ference between the cost of repair ($23,782.47) and the insurance
recovery ($18,377.40), it rejected any contention that a loss resulted
from the prospect that potential purchasers might discount the value
of the house because of the fire, stating:
Ascertaining the fair market value before and after the fire is
merely the tool used for measuring the extent of the casualty loss.
When the property suffers a repairable loss, the loss is measured
by the difference between the fair market value immediately be-
for the fire and the fair market value immediately after the fire
in its partially damaged state. Obviously, the fair market value
of such property in its damaged state amounts to no more than
an estimate or determination of what it will cost to repair the
damage and restore it to its former condition and subtracting that
sum from the fair market value before the fire. Here that sum
is stipulated and now allowed as the extent of petitioner's casualty
loss. He is not entitled to more because the property must bear the
stigma of having once been damaged by fire, and this fact alone
might make prospective future purchaser wary of buying. Fair
market value is determined by elements of value that inhere in
the property and not the groundless fears of prospective buyers.
A complete answer to petitioner's contention is found in that
portion of the statute excluding losses covered by insurance. Clearly
a taxpayer whose casualty damaged property is restored to its prior
condition by insurance funds, suffers no deductible loss under
the statute. And yet the full force of petitioner's argument here
would mean that if he had insurance coverage that paid the entire
repair bill for restoring the property to its former state, in the
sum of $23,782.47, he would still have a casualty loss in the sum
of $8,217.53. That the statute intended no deducation for a fully
insured casualty loss is too clear for argument.
Based on the same theory the IRS, In I.T. 1567,"5 refused to
allow a deduction because of a loss allegedly sustained through
depreciation in the value of a residence situated adjacent to the sea
on account of the action of the sea on such property during storms.
45II-1 CuM. BULL. 90 (1923); See also Frank P. Kendall, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
809 (1958) (wherein the taxpayer claimed a casualty loss in the amount of the
difference betwen what he believed the beach cottage was worth and the amount he
received from its sale alleging that a storm in that year frightened away prospective
purchasers). The Court in denying the loss stated:
...even if we assume, arguendo, a loss in the fair market value of the
property occurring in 1953, the record affirmatively indicates that such a
loss in value was not the result of physical damage caused by a storm or
storms in that year but was the result of fear on the part of prospective buy-
ers of damages that might be sustained in future years as a result of storms,
contemplated as possible and even probable, but which had not yet occurred
and which might never occur. Obviously such a fear on the part of pros-
pective buyers was not caused by a history of storm damages extending over
a period of several, and probably many, years.
But cf. Bank of American Nat'l Tr. & Savings Ass'n Exr. v. United States 51-1
USTC 9110 (S.D. Calif. 1950).
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The IRS noted that the taxpayer had not been compelled to spend
any money in repairing the damage done by the storms and that it
had not been necessary to move the residence on account of its
exposure to the action of the sea and ruled that the alleged loss
was only conjectural or indeterminable and did not represent a
closed and completed transaction.
Similarly in Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner," the
taxpayer was denied a casualty loss deduction for the value of base-
ment storage space which the bank claimed had lost its usefulness due
to the history of floods and the threat of future floods in the area.
The court found that the flood had not materially altered the physical
condition of the basement and that, although the bank officers had
testified that the bank had permanently abandoned the basement,
it still retained dominion over the basement and could, upon future
reconsideration, again use the space.4
Finally, not only must there be an event which results directly
in actual physical damage, but the damage must be to property
belonging to the taxpayer. For example, a shareholder is not entitled
to claim the casualty loss resulting to property owned by the corp-
oration even though the shareholder is assessed by the corporation
for the cost of repairs. 8 Nor is the taxpayer entitled to deduct as
a casualty loss damages paid to another for injury to the other
party's property or person unless the damage resulted from an
accident arising in the course of business." Thus, where the tax-
payer is involved in an accident not arising in the course of business,
he is entitled to claim only his damage as a casualty loss and he may
40Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1958), affirming
28T.C. 717 (1957).
47Te Court of Appeals recited the following with respect to the Tax Court's holding,
Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 425, 427 (4th Cir. 1958):
The Tax Court held that the fear of a future loss furnishes no basis for
a current deduction; and even if such fear diminished the market value - a
fact not found by the Tax Court -this would be a mere fluctuation, for
which no deduction may be made until a loss is actually realized by the
sale or other disposition of the property.
4 8 West v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 259
F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1958) ; Earl S. Orr, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 789 (1960) ; Estate
of Myrtle P. Dodge, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1811 (1961) (taxpayer sold the property
in 1956 to one Link who apparently rented it to one Recupero who severely damaged
the building and stole some of the fixtures; taxpayer discovered the abandonment
in December 1957 but did not foreclose until sometime in 1958; held, taxpayer
.'offered no satisfactory evidence that he actually owned the premises in 1957."
Thomas J. Draper, 15 T.C. 135 (1950) (parents not entitled to claim a casualty
loss for the destruction by fire of clothing belonging to an adult daughter although
the daughter was still being supported by the parents.).
49Stern v. Carey, 119 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ohio 1953); C. W. Stoll, CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 731 (1946); Luther Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944) acq. this issue, 1944
CUM. BULL. 26 (amount paid to library for damage to book inadvertently left on
a bus): B. M. Peyton. 10 B.T.A. 1129 '(1928); Samuel E. Mulholland. 16 B.T.A.
1331 (1929) ; L. Oransky, 1 B.T.A. 1239 (1925'). See, 4 CUM. BULL. 159 (1921)




not deduct any amount paid to the other party involved by way of
settlement or on a judgment.
A life tenant is entitled to deduct the full amount of the casualty
loss (not merely that portion of the loss theoretically attributable
to the life interest) for injury to property subject to the life estate."0
In a lease situation, the party bearing the risk of the loss is entitled
to the deduction." Thus, if the lessee is bound by a covenant in the
lease to restore and replace the leased buildings if they are destroyed,
or if he is required to surrender the property to the lessor upon
expiration of the lease "in as good order and condition as reasonable
use and wear thereof will permit," then the risk is upon the lessee
and he will be allowed the deduction." If, on the other hand, the
lessee is under no obligation to repair the damage or to make replace-
ments, then the lessee is not entitled to deduct the full amount of
the loss. In this case, since the casualty loss affects the value of both
the lessee's interest and the lessor's reversion, the loss must be appor-
tioned between them. 3 Similarly, a taxpayer committed to bear the
risk of loss by a contract to purchase property is entitled to the
casualty loss deduction."
IV. AMOUNT OF CASUALTY Loss
A. Introduction
The discussion which follows sets forth the rules applicable to
computing the amount of the loss. As in the preponderance of tax
matters, the amount of loss is a questlon of proof. In short, a tax-
payer seeking a casualty loss deduction must establish three facts:
(1) that he suffered a loss, (2) the amount of the loss," and
(3) that his loss was caused by a "casualty."
50 Bliss v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 533 (2nd Cir. 1958), 27 T.C. 770 (1957); Lena L.
Steinert, 33 T.C. 447 (1959), arq. 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 6; INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§ 611(b)(2).
51 See generally, Camp Wolters Land Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1947), reversing on this issue, 5 T.C. 336 (1945), acq. 1945 CUM. BULL. 2.
52I.T. 2150, IV-1 Cuzn. BULL. 147 (1925) ; IT. 3850, 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 20.
53Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237 (2nd Cir. 1957), affirming 24 T.C. 199
(1955), acq. 1956-2 Cuim. BULL. 5, cert. denied 355 U.S. 923 (1957).
54 Collins v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1961), aff'd and rev'd on other
grounds, 300 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1962), 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
5 Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943) ; Leonard P. Tomlinson,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 662 (1963) (auto accident, taxpayer only produced a check
issued for auto body work which was in an amount less than the claimed loss and
was dated prior to the date of the accident) ; William S. Herreshoff, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 667 (1963); Jane U. Elliott, 40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq. 1964-2 Cum.
BULL. 5; Maude T. Fearing, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 800 (1962), aff'd on other
grounds, 315 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Oceanic Apartments, Inc., 13 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 944 (1954); Estate of R. D. McDaniel, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1551 (1961);
Benjamin J. Checkoway, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1960); Paul E. Jackson,
13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1954); Clarence E. Stewart, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
921 (1953) ; Philip Allen, I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 14 (1942).
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The Tax Guide For Small Business" gives the following sum-
mary of the proof necessary to substantiate the loss deduction:
Proof of Casualty Loss. A deduction is allowed only for
damages to or losses of property owned by you. You must sub-
stantiate the amount of any casualty loss. You should be prepared
to submit evidence when it occurred:
1. Nature of casualty and when it occurred;
2. Loss was the direct result of the casualty;
3. That you were the owner of the property at the time of
the loss;
4. Cost of other adjusted basis of the property, supported by
purchase contract, checks, receipts, etc.;
5. Depreciation allowed or allowable, if any;
6. Values before and after casualty (pictures and appraisals
before and after the casualty are pertinent evidence); and
7. The amount of insurance or other compensation received,
including the value of repairs, restoration, and cleanup provided
without cost of relief agencies.
In outline form, the following are the elements of proof neces-
sary to demonstrate qualification for a casualty loss deduction:
(a) An identifiable event which reflects the constituent ele-
ments of a casualty, viz., the sudden, unexpected, or unusual nature
of the event; 7 the year in which the event occurred,58 and if the
event itself merely opened the loss transaction, the year in which
the loss transaction was closed should also be included;9 and
finally, the causal connection between the event and injury."
(b) Taxpayer is the person or entity entitled to claim the loss."'
56 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE
FOR SMALL BUSINESS, p. 93 (1965).
57 See cases cited at note 40, supra.
58 Jane U. Elliott, 40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq. 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 5; Paul E. Jackson,
13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1954).
59 United States v. Barret, 202 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1953); Nourse v., Birmingham,
73 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Iowa 1947); Williard T. Burkett, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948
(1951).
60 Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 200. A mere showing that the identifiable
event present in your case is similar to that approved in other cases as a "casualty,"
does not necessarily establish the existence of a "casualty" in your case. Compare
O.D. 1076, 5 CUM. BULL. 138 (1921), with Samuel Greenbaum, 8 B.T.A. 75 (1927),
the former allowing a loss arising from the freezing and bursting of water pipes;
the latter disallowing the loss.
61 The person or persons entitled to deduct the loss is determined by how title to the
property is held. For example, if the property is held by a husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety, and separate returns are filed, each spouse is entitled to deduct
one-half the loss. Gilbert J. Krause, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1951). But see
IT. 3304, 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 158 holding that although the property was held as
tenants by the entirety, if the husband defrayed all the expenses in repairing the
property, the husband was entitled to claim the full loss, assuming, of course, that,




(c) A description of the property sufficient to establish that
it is the property which sustained the injury."2
(d) The cost or adjusted basis of the property. 3
(e) The fair market value of the property immediately before
and after the casualty event."
(f) The amount of salvage value,65 insurance proceeds or other
compensation recovered.88
Failure to establish salvage value and/or the amount of the
insurance recovery, if any, or particularly that there was no insur-
ance recovery is a common failure." This blunder in the handling
of the case may be one which cannot be corrected.8
B. Business Property
(a) Amount of Loss
In the case of property used in a trade or business or held for
the production of income, the amount of the loss arising from partial
injury or destruction of the property is the LESSER of either (1) the
difference in the fair market value of the property immediately
preceding and immediately after the casualty event; or (2) the
amount of the adjusted basis for determining the loss from the sale
62David W. Murray, Jr., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 7 (1962); Benjamin J. Checkoway,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1960); Richard E. Stein, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 191
(1955); Gilbert J. Kraus, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1951); Isabelle B. Krome,
9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 178 '(1950); Benard L. Shackleford, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
694 (1948); Greenwood Packing Plant, 46 B.T.A. 430 (1942), acq. 1942-1 CuM.
BULL. 8, rev'd on other grounds, 131 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1942).
63 Including date of acquisition and if appropriate, the allocation of basis if the property
destroyed or damaged is comprised of several types of property. Philip Handelman,
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 878 (1961); Melvin Mailloux, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 942
(1961), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Benjamin J. Checko-
way, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1960); Virgil R. Williams, 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 106 (1960) (allocation); John W. Snyder, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1218
(1955); Paul E. Jackson, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1954); Nat Lewis, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1954).
64 Schirmer v. United States, 59-2 USTC 9572 (N.D. Calif. 1959) ; Samuel Abrams,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1546 (1964); William S. Herreshoff, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 667 (1963); Maude T. Fearing, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 800 (1962), affd
on other grounds, 315 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Isabelle B. Krome, 9 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 178 (1950).
65 Except where salvage value is used to determine the market value immediately after
the fire, or other casualty.
6 Hubinger v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1929), affirming 13 B.T.A. 960
(1928), cert. denied 281 U.S. 741 (1929) ; Ferst v. Edwards, Adm'r, 129 F. Supp.
606 (D. Ga. 1955); John W. Snyder, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1218 (1955); I.T.
4032, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 21; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c) (1960).
67 E.g., Philip Handelman, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 878 (1961); Emanuel Hollman,
38 T.C. 251 (1962).
68See, Goodman v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 681 (2nd Cir. 1953), affirming the Tax
Court's denial of a motion for rehearing filed because the taxpayer, claiming medical




or other disposition of the property involved.69 The amount thus
determined is then adjusted " . . for any insurance or other com-
pensation received."" °
6 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1960); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES, AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March
1964). Practically speaking the adjusted basis of the property is the measure of the
loss, see United States v. Koshland, 208 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953), Frank R. Hinman,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1347 (1953); and, if there is no cost basis, there is no
deduction, Belcher v. Patterson, 1960-2 USTC 9733 (N.D. Ala. 1960). Unfortu-
nately, the regulations are silent on what is meant by "immediately" after the
casualty event. Obviously the property has no value when the flood waters are
washing through the premises, or the building is in the grip of the conflagration.
Is the value measured when the flood subsides or the embers cool? The question
is in a sense academic since the statute is aimed at "permanent" loss in value (see
Jenard, supra note 44 and Citizens Bank of Weston, supra note 46. Presumably
the practical approach would be to consider the property's worth immediately after
the event (when the fire burned out, the flood subsided, etc.) which in all likeli-
hood is salvage or residual value (depending, of course, on how severely the casualty
affected the property) and then discount that loss of value for factors which would
occur or are likely to occur within a "reasonable" time after the casualty event.
The taxpayer, of course, is allowed a deduction for his clean-up expense, either as
a separate item (ordinary business expense) or as part of his decrease in value, so
that this is not a major consideration. It is, of course, difficult to foretell what
events are likely to occur and to measure or fix a "reasonable" time. Nonetheless,
it would appear that "immediately after" value should take into consideration what
the property will sell for after the property is repaired, the debris removed, the
damage assessed or clearly marked for the buyer to see (so that the buyer can deter-
mine how much he would discount the purchase price in order to pay for the rebuild-
ing) and after the immediate shock has worn off in the public's mind. This approach
is not based on the casualty loss regulations but is suggested by the general approach
to value found in the Code. For example, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), speaking to
the general valuation rules, states: "The fair market value of a particular item of
property includible in the decedent's gross estate is not to be determined by a forced
sale price." (emphasis added), and Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e), concerning the
valuation of stock, states: "If the executor can show that the block of stock to be
valued is so large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it could
not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing the market, the price at
which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market . . . may be a more
accurate indication of value than market quotations." (emphasis added). These regu-
lations indicate that as a practical matter the IRS will not accept as the loss in value
the amount determined at the height of the casualty event. See J. G. Boswell Co.,
supra note 43.
70Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c) (1960); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, DOC. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March
1964), and see, e.g., Miree v. United States, 1962-2 USTC 9756 (N.D. Ala.
1962) ; Ticket Office Equipment Co., 20 T.C. 272 (1953), acq. 1953-2 CUM. BULL.
6, affd per curiam on other grounds, 213 F.2d 318 (2nd Cir. 1954); Gilbert J.
Kraus, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1951). Salvage value is used only in a com-
plete destruction situation wherein the adjusted basis alone is used as the measure
of the loss. In other words if the difference in market values is used to determine
the amount of loss, then salvage value is a part of the "after" value of the property
and is not again deducted from the difference and this is so even if the adjusted basis
is lower, all that is allowable as a deduction is the amount of the basis. For example,
if the fair market value of an item is $1,000, the basis $900, and salvage value of
"after" casualty value is $50, the economic loss is $950, but because the amount
deductible is the "lesser" amount between market values and basis, only $900 is
deductible. Salvage value of $50 is not again deducted from the $900 to reduce the
loss to $850, Sears v. United States, 59-1 USTC 9302 (N.D. Ohio 1959). Salvage
value, of course, remains an element of proof to establish the loss. Hubinger v.
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1929),'affirming 13 B.T.A. 960 (1928),




If the property is totally destroyed, and if the fair market value
of such property immediately before the casualty is less than the
adjusted basis of such property, the amount of the adjusted basis of
such property is treated as the amount of the loss.7' The amount
deductible, of course, is decreased by salvage value, insurance, or
other recovery."
An example demonstrating the computation of the allowable
loss deduction where the property is completely destroyed, is as
follows:"
Example: You owned a building used in your business which had
an adjusted (depreciated) basis of $20,000, exclusive of land, at
the time it was completely destroyed by a hurricane. Its fair market
value just before the hurricane was only $15,000. Since this was
business property, and since it was completely destroyed, your de-
ductible loss is your adjusted basis of $20,000, decreased by salvage
value, insurance, or other recovery.
(b) "Single Property" Rule
A loss incurred in a trade or business or in any transaction
entered into for profit is determined under the rules set forth in
paragraph (a) above by reference to the single identifiable property
damaged or destroyed.7 The regulations give this example:
Thus, for example, in determining the fair market value of the
property before and after the casualty in a case where damage by
casualty has occurred to a building and ornamental or fruit trees
used in a trade or business, the decrease in value shall be measured
by taking the building and trees into account separately, and not
together as an integral part of the realty, and separate losses shall
be determined for such building and trees.
75
Another example is United States v. Koshland 8 involving these
7 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1960) as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM. BULL.
107; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174,
DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March 1964).
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c) (1960) ; IT. 4032, 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 21. Salvage value
in this situation must be deducted in computing the amount of the loss since it has
not yet been considered in the computation. Insurance "or other recovery" includes
replacement property, etc., as well as cash. For example, in Ray Durden, 3 T.C. 1
(1944), acq. 1944 CUM. BULL. 8, to arrive at the deduction, the court subtracted
the insurance proceeds and the value of the driveway laid down by the county in
settlement of damage caused to the taxpayer's house by blasting. Obviously, if the
taxpayer has made up the loss by repairs the cost of which were deducted as business
expenses, he is not entitled to a casualty loss deduction. J. G. Boswell Co., 34 T.C.
539 (1960), affd 302 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 860 (1962)
Central Arizona Ranching Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1304 (1964).
73 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DOC. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March 1964).
74
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2) (1960); United States v. Koshland, 208 F.2d 636
(9th Cir. 1953). The "single property" rule raises the importance of a proper
allocation of purchase price among various properties acquired in a single trans-
action. See, e.g., Virgil R. Williams, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 106 (1960); Stanley
Kupiszewski, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1559 (1964).
75 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (2) (1960).
76 208 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953).
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facts: Taxpayer and her husband purchased a hotel in 1925 for the
sum of $185,000 plus accrued real property taxes. For depreciation
purposes, $53,000 was allocated to the building. By 1946, taxpayer
had been allowed a total of $52,684 as depreciation for the hotel
building and had made improvements of $2,092.16. On May 20,
1946, the hotel building was destroyed by fire. The taxpayer received
proceeds of the fire incurance policies on the hotel property in the
amount of $45,000. In December 1946, she sold the land, in the
condition it had been left by the fire, for $50,000. The taxpayer
claimed that, under section 165 she sustained a deductible fire loss
of $43,166 in 1946, this being the difference between the adjusted
basis of the land and building at the time of the fire ($138,166)
and the sum of the market value of the property after the fire
($50,000) and the insurance proceeds ($45,000). The court, rely-
ing upon the "single property" rule, held that the "property"
destroyed in this case was the hotel building and since at the time
of the fire the building had an adjusted basis of $1,408, the insur-
ance proceeds ($45,000) more than compensated for the loss."
An example demonstrating the computation of the allowable
loss deduction under the "single property" rule, is as follows:"
Example (2): In 1958 A purchases land containing an office
building for the lump sum of $90,000. The purchase price is
allocated between the land ($18,000) and the building ($72,000)
for purposes of determining basis. After the purchase A planted
trees and ornamental shrubs on the grounds surrounding the build-
ing. In 1961 the land, building, trees, and shrubs are damaged
by hurricane. At the time of the casualty the adjusted basis of
the land is $18,000 and the adjusted basis of the building is
$66,000. At that time the trees and shrubs have an adjusted basis
of $1,200. The fair market value of the land and building im-
mediately before the casulty is $18,000 and $70,000, respectively,
and immediately after the casulty is $18,000 and $52,000 re-
spectively. The fair market value of the trees and shrubs imme--
diately before the casualty is $2,000 and immediately after the
casualty is $400. In 1961 subject to section 1231 and §1.1231-1.
The amount of the deduction allowable under section 165(a) with
respect to the building for the taxable year 1961 is $13,000,
computed as follows:
Value of property immediately before casualty ........ $70,000
Less: Value of property immdeiately after casualty ...... 52,000
Value of property actually destroyed .................. 18,000
'7The facts set forth in the Koshland case indicate that the taxpayer might have had
a gain. To the extent that insurance proceeds or other compensation, exceeds the
depreciated cost or other adjusted basis of the property destroyed or damaged, the
difference is a gain from an involuntary conversion. INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§§ 1033, 1245 and 1250.
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7 (b) (3) (1960), Example (2).
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Loss to be taken into account for purposes of
section 165(a):
Lessor amount of property actually destroyed
($18,000) or adjusted basis of property ($66,000). .$18,000
Less: Insurance received ........................... 5,000
Deduction allowable .............................. 13,000
The amount of the deduction allowable under section 165(a)
with respect to the trees and shrubs for the taxable year 1961
is $1,200, computed as follows:
Value of property immediately before casualty .......... $ 2,000
Less: Value of property immediately after casualty ..... 400
Value of property actually destroyed .................. 1,600
Loss to be taken into account for purposes of section 165 (a)
Lessor amount of property actually destroyed ($1,600)
or adjusted basis of property ($1,200) ............ 1,200
Prior to the adoption of the final version of Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.165-7(b)(2), the loss in a partial loss situation was
... the proportion of the adjusted basis determined under section
1011 which the value of the destroyed property bears to the value
of the entire property, reduced by any insurance or other compen-
sation received in respect of the property.'"" Proposd Treasury
Regulation § 1.165-3(c) (1) gives the following example of the
computation:
Example. A purchased an automobile for $4,200 on January 1,
1955, and at once devoted it to business use. The expected life
of the automobile was 6 years. On January 1, 1957, the auto-
mobile sustained damages through casualty. The value of the
automobile immediately before the casualty was $2,000. The
value of the automobile immedately after the casualty is $1,500.
A is compensated by insurance in the amount of $300. The amount
of the allowable deduction to A is $400 (loss of $700 less in-
surance of $300), computed as follows:
C ost ............................................. $4,200
Less: Depreciation for 1955 and 1956 at $700 per year ..... 1,400
Adjusted basis at time of casualty .................... 2,800
Value before casualty ............................. 2,000
Value after casualty ............................... 1,500
Value of destroyed property ......................... 500
Allowable loss ( 500 ) X $2,800 ................... 700
($2,000)
Less: Insurance received ... ............................ 300
Allowable deduction ............................... $ 400
The above stated method of computing the amount of the loss
has the sanction of several court decisions" although it was ques-
79 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (c) (1), 21 Fed. Reg. 4925 (1956).
80G.CM. 6122, VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 115 (1929); Fred Fazer, 10 B.T.A. 409 (1928);
Bessie Knapp, 23 T.C. 716 (1-955).
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tioned in Alcoma Association, Inc. v. United States.81 It may still
have some validity in rare situations where the taxpayer is unable
to allocate any basis to the separate properties acquired for a single
purchase price. It should be noted that the former rule gives a
higher deduction than that afforded by the rule applicable under
the final regulations (lesser of market value or adjusted basis)
where the adjusted basis of the asset is in excess of its market value
before the casualty.8"
(c) Inventory
The Tax Guide for Small Business (1964),83 p. 83, sets forth
the following rules for the treating of casualty losses with respect to
inventory."
LOSS OF INVENTORY. The manner of reporting your cas-
ualty or theft loss of inventory or items held for sale to customers
will depend upon whether you have received or will recover any
part of your loss from insurance or other reimbursement. If no
recovery or other reimbursement is anticipated, the loss will be
automatically reflected in cost of goods sold where your opening
and closing inventories are properly reported. This loss should not
be claimed again as a casualty loss. If you wish to show the loss
separately, an offsetting credit either to opening inventory or to
purchases is required.
Insurance proceeds received in the year of the loss must be
included in gross income if you reflect the loss in closing inven-
tory. However, the recovery should not be included in gross in-
come if you show the loss separately and offset the insurance against
the loss. The insurance must be accounted for in your return.
If the insurance is not received by the end of the year, you must
remove the amount of the loss from cost of goods sold.
Should your creditors forgive, in the year of the loss, part
of what you owe them because of your inventory loss, such
amounts must be taken into account as income, or you must make
appropriate adjustments to your cost of goods sold.
If suppliers replace damaged or destroyed inventory items
in the year of loss at no cost to you, no adjustments should be made:
(d) Converted Property
In the case of property which originally was not used in a
trade or business or held for income-producing purposes and which
81 239 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1956).
8 2 See, e.g., Barry v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 308 (W.D. Okla. 1958). Cf. Frank
R. Hinman, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1347 (1953).
83 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, p. 83
(1964).
84 See also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(4) (1960); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5-174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND TliEFTS, p. 7
(March 1964). But see, Ticket Office Equipment Co., 20 T.C. 272 (1953), acq.
1953-2 CuM. BULL. 6, afs'd per curiam on other grounds, 213 F.2d 318 (2nd Cir.




12. Loss sustained on furnishings (lesser of 10 or 11) .... $ 500
13. Less: estimated insurance recovery ................. None
14. Casualty loss on furnishings ...................... $ 500
15. Total loss (7 plus 14) .......................... $4,500
16. Less $100 reduction ............................. 100
17. Casualty loss deduction .......................... $4,400
(i) "From Each Casualty"
Congress has indicated that the determination of. whether the
loss arises from a single or multiple casualty is to be liberally made"
in favor of a single casualty. Events closely related in origin gen-
erally give rise to a single casualty. 3 Examples illustrating the
determination of whether the incident gave rise to a single event
include the following: "4
Example 1. Thieves broke into your home in January 1964
and stole a diamond ring and a fur coat. You sustained a loss
of $150 on the ring and $200 on the coat. This is a single
theft, and the $100 limitation is applied to the total amount of
your loss of $350. Your deductible loss from the theft is the
excess over $100, or $250.
Example 2. Your family car was damaged in an accident in
January 1964 and the amount of your loss, after insurance recovery,
was $75. In February 1964 your car was damaged in another acci-
dent and this time your loss after insurance recovery was $90. The
$100 limitation must be applied to each separate casualty loss,
and since neither accident resulted in a loss of over $100, you are
not entitled to any deduction for these accidents.
Example 3. In March 1964 hurricane winds blew the roof
from your residence and caused flood waters that further damaged
your house and demolished your furniture and personal auto-
mobile. This is considered to be a single casualty and the $100
limitation is applied against the total loss sustained as the result of
the wind and flood waters. You do not have to compute sepa-
rately the amount of loss caused by the wind and the amount
caused by the water, nor do you compute separately the loss sus-
tained on your house, your furniture, and your automobile in ap-
plying the $100 limitation.
Individual taxpayers other than husband and wife are subject to a
separate $100 floor with respect to each casualty, even though
property of other persons is damaged in connection with the same
event.' For example, if fire damages a house and household goods
of the owner, as well as the property of a visiting relative which
92H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A46 (1963); See, Treas. Reg. §
1.165_7(b) (4) (ii) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 107.
93 Ibid.
9 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 5 (March 1964). Example 3 as quoted in the text
is based on the example given in H.R. Rep. No. 749, supra note 92, at A46.
95Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(iii) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CumI.
BULL. 107; H.R. Rep. No. 749, supra note 92, at A46.
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is in the same house, the owner is subject to one $100 floor and the
visiting relative is subject to a separate $100 floor.96
(ii) jointly Owned Property - joint Returns
As indicated above, where two or more individuals (other than
husband and wife) suffer losses from the same casualty, the $100
reduction is applied separately to each and this is so whether or not
the property is held jointly or in some other form of common
ownership. 7 For example, if two brothers jointly own a house
in which both live, and a fire destroys the house, each brother would
be entitled to one-half of the loss and each would be required to
apply a separate $100 reduction to his share of the loss.
For purposes of applying the $100 floor, a husband and wife
filing a joint return for the taxable year in which the loss is al-
lowed as a deduction are treated as one individual. If a husband
and wife file a joint return, only one $100 floor applies for each
casualty regardless of whether the loss is sustained with respect to
jointly owned or separately owned property. If a husband and
wife file separate returns, each is subject to a $100 floor for each
casualty, regardless of whether the property damaged is owned
jointly or separately. 8 For example, if a loss from fire to their
personal residence is sustained by a husband and wife who own
their home jointly, a single $100 reduction is applied to such loss
in determining the amount deductible on their joint return. How-
ever, if they file separate returns, the loss must be split equally be-
tween them and each must apply a separate reduction of $100 to
his or her share of that loss."
(iii) Floor Applies in Year of Deduction
The $100 - deductible rule applies to all losses sustained after
December 31, 1963, in taxable years ending after that date."
Thus, the rule applies if the loss occurred in 1964 even though
under Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165 (h) the taxpayer deducted
the loss on his 1963 return.1"' The IRS has indicated, however, that
96 See, ibid.
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(iii) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM.
BULL. 107; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DOC. No.
5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 6 (March 1964).
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(iii) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM.
BULL. 107; H.R. Rep. No. 749, supra note 92, at A46.
99 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 6 (March 1964).
l"1 Treas. Reg. § L1.65-7(b)(4)(i) (1960), as amended, T-D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM.
BULL. 107.
101 Ibid.; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174,
DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 6 (March 1964).
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even if the casualty event occurred in 1963 or prior years, but the
loss could not be claimed because of an expectation of reimburse-
ment or recovery, the $100 reduction applies to any part of the
loss deducted in years after December 31, 1963."° The theory being
that the loss is not actually sustained until the prospect of re-
covery is ended.
(iv) Property Used Partly in Business
In the case of a casualty loss of property used partially for
business and partially for personal purposes, the $100 floor ap-
plies only to the net loss attributable to the portion of the property
used for personal purposes. For example, if a casualty causes dam-
age in the amount of $1000 to a taxpayer's automobile having an
adjusted basis of $2000, which is used 50 percent for business and
50 percent for personal purposes, and the taxpayer's insurance re-
covery with respect to the casualty is $900, the taxpayer has a net
loss of $100. Fifty percent of this loss, or $50, is considered a
business loss, and is fully deductible. The remaining $50 of loss
is personal, and is nondeductible because of the $100 floor. 3
(c) Agregation Rule
In determining the amount of a casualty loss involving real
property and improvements thereon not used in a trade or business
or in any transaction entered into for profit, the improvements (such
as buildings and landscaping) to the property damaged or de-
stroyed are considered an integral part of the property and no
separate basis need be apportioned to such improvements.
1
04
(d) Reimbursement in Later Year
If the taxpayer is reimbursed for his loss (assuming that the
prospect of recovery in the year of the casualty event did not war-
rant postponing the deduction) in a year or years after the loss
had been deducted, the recovery is included in income in the later
year under the rules provided in Internal Revenue Code of 1954
§ 111.105
102 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DOC. No. 5174, DIS-
ASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 6 (March 1964).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(iv) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CuM.
BULL. 107.
104Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943); Louis A. Edwards, 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 925 (1960); Dick H. Woods, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 388
(1960); William 0. Lindley, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 355 (1952) ; Western Products
Co., 28 T.C. 1196 (1957), acq. 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 6; G.C.M. 21013, 1939-1 CUM.
BULL. 101; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2)(ii) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786,
1965-1 CuM. BULL. 107; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(3) (1960), Example 3.
105 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, TAx GUIDE
FOR SMALL BUSINESS, p. 83 (1964); Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a)(1) (1956).
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V. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A. Introduction
As indicated above, the major factor in determining the amount
of the casualty loss is the amount by which the asset has decreased
in value, i.e., in general terms, the decrease in relative market
values. " Obviously, this calls for a demonstration of the decrease
or, in other words, proof of the loss by the application of accept-
able standards for measuring the damages. To achieve the desired
result, the taxpayer must adopt a method of valuation.
The regulations issued pursuant to section 165 seeiningly indi-
cate that there are two equally acceptable methods of reflecting the
amount of loss, first, appraisals and, secondly, cost of repairs and
replacements.0" The taxpayer, however, must not be misled and
lose sight of the theory involved, viz., the loss is measured by the
difference in market values of the asset before and after the casualty
event."0 8 Hence, proof of the cost of repairs is not sufficent to show
the amount of loss absent evidence clearly demonstrating that the
cost of repairs is indicative and corroborative of the difference in
market values."08 This principle is illustrated by the fact that the
taxpayer is entitled to deduct the amount of his loss (the difference
in market values) irrespective of whether this amount exceeds or
is less than the cost of repairs."1 The taxpayer should not forget
that a sale of the property after the casualty, though not essential
to reflect the loss, is one of the best indications of the amount of
the loss, and, for example, if the asset is sold for a price equal to
or more than adjusted basis (if higher) or market value of the
property before the casualty, taxpayer has no loss regardless of the
testimony of his appraisers and the cost of repairs."' Finally, the
taxpayer, in proving his case, must keep in mind the type of prop-
erty involved (business or nonbusiness) and whether the "separate
property" or aggregation rules apply. Thus, if the aggregation rule
106 See Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
1 ' Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7 (a) (2) '(1960).
108 Helvering v. Owens, supra note 106.
109 Hubinger v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1929) affirming 13 B.T.A. 960
(1928), cert. denied 281 U.S. 741 (1929); Paul E. Jackson, 13 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1175 (1954); Robert H. Montgomery, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 77 (1947);
Ray Durden, 3 T.C. 1 (1944), acq. 1944 CuM. BULL. 8; George B. Friend, 8 B.T.A.
712 (1927), acq. VII-2 CuM. BULL. 14 (1928). But cf. Clarence E. Stewart, 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 921 (1953).
11 0 A.R.R. 4725, II-1 CUM. BULL. 143 (1924) ; Miree v. United States, 62-2 USTC
1 9756 (N.D. Ala. 1962); Graham M. Brush, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 649 (1962).
But cf. Clapp v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming 36 T.C.
905 (1961). Taxpayers are well advised to consider appraisals as the major element
of proof since the difference in market values may in some instances exceed repairs.
"H E.g., Dick H. Woods, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 388 (1960).
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is thereafter converted to either of these uses, the loss is treated in
the same way as the loss from any other business property, except
that if the fair market value of the property on the date of conver-
sion is less than the adjusted basis of the property at that time, the
fair market value is used as the basis for determining the amount
of loss.85 Where the property is held partly for nonbusiness pur-
poses and partly for business purposes or for the production of
income, the casualty loss deduction must be computed as though two
separate pieces of property were involved - one business and the
other personal."
C. Nonbusiness Property
(a) Amount of Loss
In the case of nonbusiness property, I.T. 4032,17 sets forth the
following rule:
It is held that the amount of loss which is deductible . . .
in the case of depreciable nonbusiness property, is the difference
between the value of the property immediately preceding the
casualty and its value (including salvage value) immediately after
the casualty, but not in excess of an amount equal to the ad-
justed basis of the property, reduced by any insurance or com-
pensation received. In other words, the amount of insurance or
other compensation received must be applied to the amount of the
loss otherwise determined, whether measured by the difference
between the value of the property immediately before and im-
mediately after the casualty, or limited to the adjusted basis of
the property ....
This is the same rule applicable to business property except that it
does not include the business property provision dealing with the
total destruction of the asset.88
An example demonstrating the computation of the allowable
loss deduction in a situation where nonbusiness property is partially
destroyed is as follows:8"
Example (1). In 1956 B purchases for $3,600 an automobile
8 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(5) (1960) as amended T.D. 6712, 1964-1 (Part 1) CUM.
BULL. 107; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(b) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6712, 1964-1
(Part 1) Cum. BULL. 107.
86G.C.M. 8628, IX-2 CUM. BULL. 112 (1930), Rev. Rul. 286, 1953-2 Cum. BULL.
20; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174,
DISASTERS, CASUALES AND THEFTS, p. 8 (March 1964),
871950-2 CuM. BULL. 21; Gilbert J. Kraus, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1071 (1951);
Rev. Rul. 54-85, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 58; Rev. Rul. 79, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 41;
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (1960), as amended T.D. 6786 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 107.
8See also, Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939); Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp.
322 (W.D. Okla. 1943); J. H. Anderson, 7 CHH Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1948);
G.C.M. 21013, 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 101 G.C.M. 16255, XV-1, CuM. BULL. 115
(1936); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM.
BULL. 107.
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which he uses for nonbusiness purposes. In 1959 the automobile
is damaged in an accidental collision with another automobile.
The fair market value of B's automobile is $2,000 immediately
before the collision and $1,500 immediately after the collision.
B receives insurance proceeds of $300 to cover the loss. The
amount of the deduction allowable under section 165(a) for the
taxable year 1959 is $200, computed as follows:
Value of automobile immediately before casualty ........ $2,000
Less: Value of automobile immediately after casualty ..... .1,500
Value of property actually destroyed .................. 500
Loss to be taken into account for purposes of section
(165a): Lessor amount of property actually destroyed
($500) or adjusted basis of property ($3,600) ...... 500
Less: Insurance received ............................ 300
Deduction allowable ................................ 200
(b) $100 - Deductible Provision
Pursuant to section 165(c)(3)90 a casualty loss described in
(c) (3) ("loss of property not connected with a trade or business")
which arises after December 31, 1963, is deductible only to the
extent that the amount of the loss to the taxpayer arising from each
casualty exceeds $100.
An example demonstrating the inclusion of the $100 deductible
provision in the computation of the allowable loss, is as follows:"1
Example. Mr. Lee's home, which cost him $4,000, including
land, was partially destroyed by a flood following a storm in
March 1964. The value of the property (building and land) im-
mediately before the storm was $7,500 and the value immediately
after the storm was $2,500. His household furnishings were
completely destroyed. They cost him $1,250 but had a fair market
value before the storm of $500. His insurance did not cover this
type of damage and he estimated no recovery. His casualty loss
is $4,500, but his deduction is limited to $4,400, computed in
the following manner:
1. Value of property before storm ................... $7,500
2. Value of property after storm .................... 2,500
3. Decrease in value of property .................... $5,000
4. Adjusted basis of property (Cost in this case) ....... 4,000
5. Loss sustained on property (lesser of 3 or 4) ........ $4,000
6. Less: estimated insurance recovery ................. None
7. Casualty loss on property ........................ $4,000
8. Value of furnishings before storm ................. $ 500
9. Value of furnishings after storm .................. None
10. Decrease in value of furnishings .................. $ 500
11. Adjusted basis of furnishings (cost) ............... 1,250
90Revenue Act of 1964 § 208, 78 Stat. 19; Treas. Reg. § 1 .16571,b)(4) 1 ), as
amended, T.D. 6786, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 107.
91 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 5 (March 1964).
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applies, taxpayer has failed his burden of proof if he proves only
the market value of one of the units of property involved as, for
example, showing the value of trees and shrubs, but not the value
of the entire property."1
B. Appraisals - Expert Witnesses
Treasury Regulation § 1.65-7(a) (2) (i) provides:
In determining the amount of loss deductible under this sec-
tion, the fair market value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the casualty shall generally be ascertained by
competent appraisal. This appraisal must recognize the effects
of any general market decline affecting undamaged as well as
damaged property which may occur simultaneously with the cas-
ualty, in order that any deduction under this section shall be limited
to the actual loss resulting from damage to the property.
The Internal Revenue Service has also indicated that "[a]p-
praisals should be made by an experienced and reliable appraiser.
The appraiser's knowledge of sales of comparable property, condi-
tions in the area, his familiarity with your property before and after
the casualty, and the method used by him are important elements
in proving a casualty loss.11
In deciding to secure expert assistance in determining the amount
of the loss, the taxpayer should keep these practical considerations
in mind:
(a) As is obvious but bears repeating, the more competent
and skilled the appraiser, the more likely it is that the taxpayer will
succeed in his burden of proof."' Since the appraisal fee may be
deducted as an expense of determining tax liability if the taxpayer
itemizes his deductions, the taxpayer should not lose sight of the
fact that the government is paying part of the expense. The usual
compulsion to proceed as cheaply as possible should not, therefore,
be the only factor considered particularly when the cost of a skilled
appraiser may reap larger ordinary income deductions.
(b) The taxpayer should keep in mind that the government (i)
instead of producing expert testimony on its behalf, may rely solely
on the presumption of correctness in which case the taxpayer will
112Western Products Co., 28 T.C. 1196, 1218 (1957), acq. 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 6. Cf.
Mary Cheney Davis, 16 B.T.A. 65 (1929), acq. VIII-2 CuM. BULL. 13 (1929).
113 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 8 (March 1964); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, TAx GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, p. 92
(1965).
1 14 Mary F. Cary, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 724 (1948) (hurricane damage to trees;
taxpayer relying on the testimony of a real estate appraiser to show decrease in
market value and a forest engineer and former park commissioner to show cost of
replacement, was allowed the full deduction claimed.) ; Graham M. Brush, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 649 (1962) (Tax Court relied on taxpayer's experts.).
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ordinarily prevail if his expert has some degree of competence; 15
or (ii) the Service may rely on its own valuation engineer ho
will suffer, by comparison with a local expert, for lack of familiarity
with the local conditions." 6
(c) While the Court will be the final arbiter of the witnesses'
qualifications,"' any witness familiar with the property is better
than no witness, even if the witness called is the taxpayer himself,"'
and the taxpayer is likely to be allowed some part of his deduction
even if his expert is held less qualified than the Service's witness."9
(d) In preparing to give testimony or supplying background
information to the appraiser, the taxpayer should not overlook such
facts as the assessed value for real estate tax purposes, value fixed
for insurance coverage, and after the casualty, the amount of in-
surance claim and insurance settlement, prior listing of the property
115 Royal Little, 31 T.C. 607 (1958), acq. 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 4, aff'd on other grounds,
273 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1960) (taxpayer relying on the deposition of a local realtor
and appraiser, prevailed on the full amount of the deduction claimed since the
Commissioner offered no evidence in opposition and the Tax Court found tax-
payer's expert adequately qualified to value the property before and after the
storm. ).
11
6 Biddle v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (The Court relied more
heavily on taxpayer's expert although he had seen the property two years before the
storm and rendered his appraisal after seeing the property more than four years
after the storm, than upon the Internal Revenue Service's witness who had visited
the property two years after the storm and had not seen it before the storm.).
But cf. William 0. Lindley, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 355 (1952) and Ralph Walton,
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 653 (1961) where the court relied on the Internal Revenue
Service's experts as being more qualified than taxpayer's witnesses.
"1 E.g., J. H. Anderson, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1948); Donald G. Graham,
35 T.C. 273 (1960), acq. 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 4.
18 Nat Lewis, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1954) (taxpayer was sustained on his
own uncontradicted testimony) ; Carl A. Haslacher, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 314
(1950) (taxpayer, trying his own case, testified for himself, his testimony being
based on what he learned from speaking with others. The IRS called an expert
who had not seen the property until three years after the storm. The Tax Court,
commenting that the taxpayer's own testimony was not as strong as it might have
been if he called experts more knowledgeable and experienced than himself, did
allow a deduction of $1,300, an amount between the taxpayer's high of $1,800 and
the government's low of $750.). Cf. Melvin Mailloux, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 942
(1961), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) (The Tax Court
sustained the government because the taxpayer was (1) not an expert appraiser;
(2) the items lost were listed from memory; (3) no attempt to find their depreci-
ated value; and (4) no description of the lost items.) ; Bernard L. Shackleford,
7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 694 (1948) (Tax Court while considering taxpayer's testi-
mony relied more heavily on the testimony of expert called by the taxpayer.).
119S. F. Horn, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 177 (1959) (taxpayer claiming $10,000 was
allowed $5,000) ; Jay Howard, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 413 (1959) (taxpayer
claimed $1,275, the IRS allowed $192, and Tax Court sustained a deduction of
$750 after discounting the taxpayer's expert's testimony for lack of familiarity with
the property); Doyle E. Collup, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 128 (1962) (the Tax
Court after considering the testimony, lowered the value of the property as appraised
before the storm from $29,000 to $26,000 but accepted the appraised value for the
property after the storm); Ralph Walton, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 653 (1961)
(taxpayer claimed $3,000, the IRS alloed $1,460; and the Tax Crt $2,000)0 
William 0. Lindley, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 355 (1952) (taxpayer claimed $25,000




for sale, other attempts to sell the property and other similar facts
which have the effect of "pegging" value.12
(e) The taxpayer should not forget the value of demonstrative
evidence, i.e., photographs, diagrams, etc., in proving the amount
of loss particularly as corroborative of the testimony of witnesses.
The cost of producing this type evidence is treated in the same man-
ner as the cost of appraisals.' 1
C. Repairs and Replacement Cost
Treasury Regulation § 1.165-7 (a) (2) (ii) provides:
The cost of repairs to the property damaged is acceptable as evi-
dence of the loss of value if the taxpayer shows that (a) the re-
pairs are necessary to restore the property to its condition imme-
diately before the casualty, (b) the amount spent for such repairs
is not excessive, (c) the repairs do not care for more than the
damage suffered, and (d) the value of the property after the re-
pairs does not as a result of the repairs exceed the value of the
property immediately before the casualty.
Included in such costs are clean-up expenses. 2 ' Whatever the
"sanctity" of the Service's regulations, taxpayers should remember
that in court they must satisfy the market value tests propounded
by Owens and may well fail their burden unless they tie the cost
of repairs into market value.' This is not to say that the cost of
repairs and replacements cannot be relied upon in dealing with the
Service or that in some cases the courts do not consider these costs
as a more reliable indicator of the loss in value than the testimony
of experts.' Indeed, in some reported decisions the courts appear
to rely solely upon the cost of repairs."z But as indicated in dis-
cussing appraisals, some evidence is better than no evidence and
12DGilbert J. Kraus, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1951); Ferst v. Edwards, 129 F.
Supp. 606 (D. Ga. 1955) (the Court relied upon the value found by a real estate
appraisal when the property was listed for sale). But cf. Andrew A. Maduza, 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1961) which stated that the listing of the property for
sale does not rise to the dignity of an appraisal of its fair market value.
121 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 8 (March 1964).
122 Ibid.
123 See cases cited, supra note 109.
124Clapp v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming 36 T.C. 905
(1961).
Petitioners contend that they had a right to a deduction for the market
value of the sand lost; not for the cost of its replacement. The court,
however, did not purport to allow the deduction as one for the cost of
replacement. It looked to the cost of replacement as evidence of market
value before loss. This method of ascertaining the amount of the loss is
sanctioned by Treasury Regulation § 1.165-7(a)(2) (ii), and the court
did not err in employing it here .... But, for the reasons which we have
already stated, the court could well have determined that the appraisal
offered was not competent and that replacement cost was the most reliable
evidence.
Andrew W. Maduza, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1961).
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the taxpayer, if he introduces evidence of the cost of repairs and
replacements, is likely to succeed in at least a part of the deduction
claimed."
The taxpayer would be well advised to consider proving his
case from both points of view, first, expert testimony on the rela-
tive market values, and second, proof of the cost of repairs or re-
placements. In point of fact, a review of the decisions dealing
with the casualty losses indicates that both elements of proof were
present in most cases in which the taxpayer was sustained by the
court in the full amount of the deduction claimed."7 Evidence of
cost of repairs and replacements may also be used to support a
shaky or less qualified witness.
D. Automobiles
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated in several sources...
that: "The so-called bluebooks issued periodically by various auto-
mobile organizations are useful in determining the value of motor
vehicles. The amount offered for your vehicle as a trade-in on a
new vehicle is not usually a measure of the true value of the ve-
hicle." The Service, however, has sanctioned the use of "trade-in"
value in situations where there are appraisals of the "trade-in"
value of the automobile both before and after the casualty.129 Clearly,
taxpayers may not rely upon the appraisal of the "trade-in" value
to establish the fair market value of the automobile before the
casualty and the actual price at which the auto is sold on the open
market after the accident as evidence of market value after the
casualty."'0
VI. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
A. Relationship to Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Commissioner's original position on the integration of
125 Schirmer v. United States, 59-2 USTC 9572 (N.D. Calif. 1959); Winters v.
United States, 58-1 USTC 9205 (N.D. Okla. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 261
F.2d 675 '(10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 943 (1959) ; Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 19 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.H. 1937) ; Jane U. Elliott, 40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq.
1964-1 (Part 1) CuM. BULL. 4.
126 David W. Murray, Jr., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 7 (1962) ; Richard E. Stein, 14 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 191 (1955).
127 E.g., Mary F. Cary, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 724 (1948); Mary Cheney Davis, 16
B.T.A. 65 (1929), acq. VIII-2 CuM. BULL. 13 (1929).
128 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 8 (March 1964); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, p. 92
(1965).
129 G.C.M. 16255, XV-1 CuM. BULL. 115 (1936); Gus S. Caras, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1103 (1964) (dicta).
130 Gus S. Caras, supra note 129. Ordinarily, if the taxpayer has $50 or $100 deductible
collision insurance on an automobile, the amount of loss would be the $50 or $100,




Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231 (Section 117(j) of the 1939 Code)
and 165 (Section 23(e) and (f) of the 1939 Code) was set forth
in Treasury Regulation 118, Section 39.117(j)-i(a) (2):
For the purpose of this section, the "involuntary conversion" of
property is the conversion of such property into money or other
property as a result of destruction in whole or in part, theft or
seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemna-
tion or the threat or imminence thereof. Losses upon the destruc-
tion in whole or in part, theft or seizure, requisition or condemna-
tion of property are treated as losses upon an involuntary conver-
sion whether or not there was a conversion of the property into
money or other property. For example, if a capital asset held for
more than six months, with an adjusted basis of $400, is stolen,
and the loss from this theft is not compensated for by insurance
or otherwise, the $400 loss is included in the computations under
section 117(j).
Substantially the same language was incorporated in the initial regu-
lations adopted under Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231."3 The Com-
missioner's position, however, has not gone without challenge. In
Maurer v. United States,"' and Oppenheimer v. United States,""
both decided under the original regulation, the courts held that un-
insured losses arising from the destruction (drought, windstorm) of
ornamental trees and shrubs on residential property were deducfikle
in full as casualty losses under Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165 and
did not have to be first applied against Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §
1231 gains.
To alleviate the hardship of the Commissioner's interpreta-
tion," ' Congress amended Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231 (section
49 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958) as follows:
(a) TREATMENT AS ORDINARY LOSS. - Section 1231 (a)
(relating to property used in the trade or business and in-
voluntary conversions) is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following new sentence: "In the case of any property
used in the trade or business and of any capital asset held for
more than 6 months and held for the production of income,
this subsection shall not apply to any loss, in respect of
which the taxpayer is not compensated for by insurance in
any amount, arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft."
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. - The amendment made by subsection
(a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1957.
131 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(e), 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 547, 550.
32284 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1960), reversing 178 F. Supp. 223 (D. Kan. 1959). In
Rev. Rul. 61-54, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 398, the IRS announced that it will not follow
the Maurer Case.
13 220 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
134 See S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 74-75 (1958) 203-204.
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Based upon the legislative history of the section,"s' the Com-
missioner amended Treasury Regulation § 1.1231-1(e)
131 to pro-
vide that section 1231 does not apply to losses arising with respect
to ". . . both property used in the trade or business and any capital
asset held for more than 6 months and held for the production of
income, which losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft, and which are not compensated for by in-
surance in any amout.... "
In short, casualty losses arising from the destruction of capital
assets held for personal uses (e.g., residential property) or assets
used in trade or business or held for production of income which
were partially insured must still be applied first to section 1231
gains. 37 This interpretation of the 1958 amendment has not, how-
ever, been accepted by the courts.13
B. Personal Expenses Incident to Casualty
The expenditure by a taxpayer of amounts for temporary hotel
or apartment accommodations for the period during which his home
was without heat, light, and/or other utilities or of amounts for
the cost of temporary lights, fuel, and moving expenses, constitute
personal expenses and may not be deducted as part of the casualty
loss. 39 Amounts received through insurance for reimbursement of
13 S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 203-204 (1958):
. . .The amendment applies with respect to, for example, loss incurred
as the result of the destruction of a taxpayer's oil tanks which he used for
oil storage in his trade or business, but on which he was unable to obtain
insurance. On the other hand, the amendment does not apply to loss aris-
ing from the destruction of theft of the taxpayer's uninsured personal
automobile. The amendment is intended to benefit business taxpayer who,
because of the special hazards of their business or for other reasons, carry
their own insurance. ....
136 T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 186, 187.
137 J. H. Anderson, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1948); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS,
p. 15 (March 1964). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(e) (1957), as amended,
T.D. 6394, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 186, 187.
138 Morrison v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Tenn. 1964); Killebrew v.
United States, 234 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Tenn. 1964); Hall v. United States, 64-2
USTC 1 9770 (E.D. Tenn. 1964). In view of the favorable judicial outlook, tax-
payers should claim all casualty losses in full as regular section 165 losses. See also
H.R. 7502, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.i (1965), which would amend INT. REv. CODE
of 1954 § 1231(a) by adding this sentence:
In the case of any involuntary conversion of property . . . which is
attributable to a storm, flood, fire, or other casualty designated by the
President of the United States as a major disaster .. .this subsection shall
not apply to such involuntary conversion whether resulting in gain or loss,
if during the taxable year, the recognized losses from such conversion
exceed the recognized gains from such conversions.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 556, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), and Senate Finance Com-
mittee Amendments to H.R. 7502, 7 CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6161B.
1
3
9 Rev. Rul. 59-398, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 76; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP;T
OF TREASURY DOC. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 3 (March
1964); Richard A. Dow, 16 T.C. 1230 (1951) (cost of providing the household
with water during four-month period when the well was polluted was not deductible).
VOL. 43
CASUALTY LOSSES
family living expenses due to the loss of the use of a residence are
taxable income and are not offset against the allowable amount of
the casualty loss."'
C. Computation of Net Operating Loss
Casualty losses, whether or not involving business property, are
treated as attributable to a trade or business for the purpose of
computing the net operating loss for carryback and carryover pur-
poses.1 ' However, the $100 nondeductible portion of the loss must
be excluded in the computation. As stated in H. R. Rep. No. 749:'"
Under section 172(d) (4) (C) of the code a personal casualty
or theft loss is not treated as a nonbusiness expense for purposes
of computing a net operating loss. The $100 floor applies in the
computation of the net operating loss, but the net operating loss
carried back or carried over is not again reduced in the year to
which carried.
Losses arising from expropriations by the Cuban Government are
treated as regular casualty losses for net operating loss purposes
and not as expropriation losses under section 172 (k).'4
D. Cleanup Expense
If the taxpayer is relying upon the cost of repairs or replace-
ments as evidence of the decrease in the market value of the prop-
erty after the casualty, the cost figure used should include the ex-
pense incurred in cleaning up the debris.'" On the other hand, if
the taxpayer is relying on the testimony of experts to establish the
relative market values, he should insure that the amount of dim-
inution in fair market value testified to by his witnesses is measured
just after the loss has taken place and before cleanup has begun.
The expense of cleaning up should be added to this permanent
loss in value.' If a taxpayer does not actually incur any expense
in cleaning, as where, for example, he sells the property as is, pre-
sumably he should add to the permanent loss in value an estimate
for cleanup expense. This is so because the price the taxpayer could
14' Rev. Rul. 59-360, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 75, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY, DOC. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March
1964).
.4'Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(d) (1960); INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 172(d)(4)(c);
Treas. Reg. § 1.172-3(a) (3) (iii) (1956); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS, CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 10 (March
1964).
14 H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A47 (1963) ; see also S. Rep. No. 830,
88th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 210 (1964).
143 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 165(i)(2)'(c).
144 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 8 (March 1964).
145 Ralph Walton, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 653 (1961); David W. Murray, Jr., 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 7'(1962).
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receive for the property immediately after the casualty would be its
bargained-for value less the cost of cleaning up the damage."
E. Rehabilitation Payments - Disaster Relief
Amounts received by the taxpayer from his employer or from
disaster relief agencies, in the form of cash or property for the pur-
pose of restoring or rehabilitating property lost or damaged in a
disaster, reduces the amount of the deductible loss."' If the reim-
bursement exceeds the taxpayer's basis in the property prior to the
casualty, the amount of the excess cannot be used to increase the
basis of the property,""' but such payments do not come within the
concept of gross income and should not be included in the gross
income of the recipients for income tax purposes."' Such amounts
are deductible by the employer as business expenses."
Disaster relief received in the form of food, medical supplies,
and other forms of subsistence received by the taxpayer which are
not replacements of lost or destroyed property do not reduce the
amount of the casualty loss deduction and do not represent taxable
income.' The same rule applies to cash gifts used to repair the
property but not restricted to that purpose.'
F. Use and Occupancy Insurance
Use the occupancy insurance proceeds are not proceeds from
casualty, to the extent that such proceeds are reimbursemnt for
actual loss of net profit in the business. Such proceeds are income
and are taxed in the same manner as the profits for which they are
substituted would have been taxed.'
G. Basis Adjustments
The Tax Guide for Small Business'"' sets forth the following
explanation of the adjustments which must be made to the basis
of the property after a casualty:
The basis of property damaged or destroyed by a casualty must
be reduced by the allowable loss deduction. The basis must be
146 Ralph Walton, supra note 145.
147 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,






152 Rev. Rul. 64-329, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 58.
153 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 5174, DISASTERS,
CASUALTIES AND THEFTS, p. 7 (March 1964).
154 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 334, TAx GUIDE
FOR SMALL BUSINESS, p. 92 (1965). See, e.g., Ferst v. Edwards, 129 F. Supp. 606
(D. Ga. 1955).
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further reduced by the amount of any insurance or other compensa-
tion which you receive.
Example 1. Your truck is involved in an accident and, after
appraisals have been made, you determine the loss to be $200.
You carry $50 deductible insurance and receive $150 from the in-
surance company. Your deductible casualty loss is $50 ($200 less
$150 insurance recovered). The basis of your truck must be re-
duced by the amount of your casualty loss, $50; it must further
be reduced by the $150 of insurance received.
Example 2. Your building, which is partially destroyed by
fire, has a basis of $15,000. Its value was $30,000 just before the
fire and $20,000 immediately after, and you collected $10,000 in-
surance. You have no casualty loss deduction since your recovery
was equal to the value of the destroyed portion. The basis of
your building is reduced by $10,000, the amount of recovery.
Of course, amounts which are not business expenses paid or
incurred to replace or restore property damaged or destroyed as
a result of a casualty are capital expenditures and should be added
to the remaining basis of the property. These adjustments are re-
quired to determine your adjusted basis of the property.
